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Comments
WATER AND WATERCOURSES-NAVIGABILTY OF STREAMS n MISSOUI
Tiedeman in his treatise on Real Property, when discussing what is a navigable
stream, said: "Perhaps there is not a more difficult question to answer in the law
of real property... The courts of this country have been discussing the problem
for many years and have come to different conclusions of the various branches and
subdivisions of the question!'' The question of navigability of streams in Missouri
has been recently brought to the attention of the general public by newspaper reports
1. TEDmiAN, REAL PaoPERmr § 599, p. 872 (4th Ed. by Gill, 1924).
(401)
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
of Elder v. Delcour.2 This was an action under the declaratory judgment act to
decide plaintiffs right to use the Meramec River where it flows across defendant's
land in Dent County. Defendant is the owner of a farm in Dent County and the
Meramec River, which rises in Dent County twenty-five miles from defendant's
farm, flows across his land. The river there is navigable by canoes, row boats, and
other small floating craft, but not by larger boats or vessels. In the past it was used
for floating logs at this point and can still be so used. It is well stocked with fish
and is heavily fished by sportsmen both by wading and by floating. Defendant
posted signs prohibiting trespassing or fishing without his permission. Plaintiff, who
had a fishing license, was floating down the river when his passage was blocked by
a water gate, and defendant threatened plaintiff with suit for trespass. Plaintiff
told defendant that he was going to proceed down the river, crossing the water gate,
so that he would tie up and wade while fishing likely spots, that if he found
immovable obstructions, he would carry his canoe around them. He further
asserted that he would camp to eat lunch or repair his canoe f necessary. Defendant
contended that the stream was not navigable and that he had the right to restrain
the public from trespassing thereon. The Circuit Court of Dent County found for
plaintiff and decided that the Meramec is public water subject to travel by plaintiff
and those who desire to wade or float down it in boats for purposes of fishing.
Defendant appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals which reversed the decision
of the trial court and decided that fishing by wading or floating in small boats is
not sufficient to make a river navigable, thus not allowing private ownership to
be subjected to the public easement. The case was ordered transferred to the Mlis-
souri Supreme Court for further consideration, which court affirmed the trial court,
holding that the Meramec was suitable for public and commercial purposes and that
the bed was a public highway for travel by floating and wading, and one who
travelled for fishing purposes was not a trespasser. Although the court's reasoning
will be discussed later, it is significant to mention here, as a preface to later para-
graphs, that the court speaks of navigability in two senses. The broad sense of the
word means that the river in question admits of such extensive navigation that the
state retains title to the bed of the stream. The narrow sense of the word (which
often substitutes for "navigable" such words as "public highways", "floatable
streams", or "privately owned streams subject to public easement") means that
the stream does not allow sufficient navigation to warrant state retention of title
to the bed, but it does not warrant public easement.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss navigable waters over which
the United States Federal Government exercises control; it is limited to a discussion
of those waters over which Missouri exercises jurisdiction.
THE ENGLISH RuLE
In England, where all the principal streams of any Importance are but continua-
tions of sea inlets, the common law rule as to navigability has been said to be that
a stream is navigable only as far as the ebb and flow of the tide can be felt. It has
2. 263 S.W. 2d 221 (Mo. App. 1953), 269 S.W. 2d 17 (Mo. 1954).
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been doubted, however, whether this is the true and unqualified rule in England.3
It became clear, at any rate, that such a tidal theory of navigability was not suited
to the territory which is now the United States of America, where great inland
streams and rivers, though never affected by tides, carried a large amount of neces-
sary commerce. Although there are still some evidences of adherence to the common
law rule, the tide test did not gain approval by the majority of the American states.
The majority opinion is that navigable waters are those capable of being navigated,
or navigable in fact.4 However, there is a fairly general view that all tidewater
prima facie is navigable.5
STATUTORY DECLARATIONS OF NAVIGABILITY
The absolute necessity for public use of the streams and rivers of the frontier
country made it necessary for the first legislatures to adopt statutes protecting such
right. Although modern highways make traffic on Missouri streams less necessary
at the present time, a great amount of useful traffic is still carried thereon, and justi-
fies retention of such protective statutes.6 Certain streams which were not navigable
in the sense that the state owned the beds were valuable for millruns, and an attempt
was made to declare these streams navigable by statute, calling them "public
highways". 7 Trouble arose, however, in connection with those statutes which called
streams navigable or public highways which in fact were not navigable.8 The
Springfield Court of Appeals in Elder v. Delcour, speaking of such statutory de-
clarations said:
"We find it is unnecessary to discuss the state laws which declare certain
non-navigable streams to be public highways. In the first place the Supreme
Court of this state has held that the legislature has no right to declare a non-
navigable stream navigible. The law clearly is that the question as to
whether or not a stream is navigable is a judicial question."9
The reference to the supreme court evidently is to the case of State ex rel. Applegate
v. Taylor, supra note 7, which agreed with the contention that the "legislature had
no authority to establish and declare the Chariton River to be navigable even
though it had intended to do so by virtue of the act of 1845,10 for the reason
assigned, that the federal government alone possesses that power." The Applegate
3. 56 AaL. JuR. Waters, § 178, p. 643: "... an examination of the English deci-
sions and the works of the textwriters of the time leads to the conclusion that the
tidal test of navigability has never been the rule of the English courts, but that
rather the question has been determined with respect to actual usability for naviga-
tion." See also 42 L.R.A. 305 (1899) for an exhaustive history of the English rule.
4. 56 Amu. Jun., Waters, § 177, p. 642 et seq.; McKinney v. Northcutt, 114 Mo.
App. 146, 154, 89 S.W. 351, 354 (1905); Hickey v. Hazard, 3 Mo. App. 480, 484; TIEDE-
AlAN, op cit, supra.
5. 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters, § 4, p. 48.
6. Mo. CoNsT. Art I, § 1 (1875); Mo. REv. STAT. § 560.545, 560.550 (1949); State v.
Wright, 201 Mo. App. 92, 95, 208 S.W. 149, 150 (1919).
7. State ex rel. Applegate v. Taylor, 224 Mo. 393, 123 S.W. 892 (1909).
8. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 83, § 1.
9. 263 S.W. 2d at p. 224.
10. Mo. Laws 1845, p. 299.
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case involved an act of the state legislature which allowed certain rivers to be
improved by the county through which it flowed.11 The act specifically exempted
navigable streams from the act, and appellants urged that the act of 1845, referred
to above, which declared that the Grand Chariton River was a "public highway",
had the effect of removing the Chariton from the improvement act. However, the
court, by the language quoted, disagreed with that contention, agreeing with the
respondents that the legislature had no authority to declare a river navigable.
A good reason for not allowing the legislature to declare a stream navigable
that is not navigable in fact is the Constitutional provision against the taking of
private property for public use except by eminent domain proceedings. If an other-
wise non-navigable stream were declared navigable by statute, the riparian owner
would either lose title altogether if the broad sense of navigability were used, so
that title to the stream bed would be transferred to the state, or he would at least
have his interest in the stream subjected to a public easement, if the narrow sense
of navigability were used. It should be clear that the state can no more declare a
non-navigable stream a public highway, then it could build a highway through a
farm without compensating the owner therefor. The general rule of law undoubtedly
is that the state cannot in any way make a non-navigable stream navigable thereby
destroying or considerably damaging the property rights of adjacent riparian owners
without making compensation. Thus, if the public good may be enhanced by calling
non-navigable streams public highways, the only way it can be permitted constitu-
tionally is through eminent domain.12 Therefore, it is quite evident that the Missouri
legislature may not declare a river navigable or a public highway when it is not so
in fact.
Many rivers in Missouri were effected by such statutory declarations, and
several of these statutes have never been repealed. The Salt River from its junction
with the Mississippi River to the junction of the North fork, the Middle and South
forks of the Salt River was declared navigable.' 3 The Loutre River below Carroll's
Mill was declared a public highway.14 The Current River above section ten in
township thirty-one, north of range six west was declared not to be a navigable
stream, but any person building a mill dam on the portion concerned was compelled
to provide a "good and sufficient way" for rafts belonging to mill owners up
stream from the dam in question.' 6 The Meramec River above Crooked Creek was
declared a public highway, but that act was repealed eighteen years later.16 Fourche-
a-Courtois Creek below Sawyer's mill was declared a public highway.' 7 The
Ni-chi-na-bo-ta-na river was declared a navigable stream and public highway
from its mouth to the northern boundary of Missouri, but that act was repealed
11. Mo. Laws, 1903, p. 234.
12. 56 Am. Jus., Waters, § 185, p. 651, 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters, § 7 b, p. 57; 19
YALE L. J. 654 (1910); 1 FA ui~w, WATRS p. 119 (1904).
13. Mo. Laws 1830, p. 80.
14. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 81.
15. Mo. Laws, 1838, p. 37.
16. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 83; repealed by Mo. Laws, 1856, p. 172.
17. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 83.
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ten years later.' 8 The Ni-Da-Wah river was declared to be a navigable stream
from its mouth to Buchanan's fork.1 9 The North Grand River from its mouth to
where the township line dividing townships sixty-two and sixty-three north crosses
the east and west forks of said river was declared a public highway, but that act
was repealed thirty years later.20 Apple Creek from its mouth to Inggram's mill
was declared a navigable stream.2 1 Cowskin or Elk River in Newton County below
Holmes and Wallaces' mill was declared a public highway, but that act was repealed
thirty-one years later.2 2 Fourche-a-Courtois River below the mouth of Hazel
Creek was declared a public highway, amending the law of 1838, p. 83, supra., note
17.23 The Sac River from its mouth to the three forks was declared a public high-
way. 2 4 The Spring River from its mouth to the section line dividing sections eleven
and twelve in township twenty-eight, range thirty west, was declared a public
highway, but that act was repealed two years later.2 5 Bryant's fork of the White
River from where the stream crosses the state line in Ozark county up to Bowlin's
mill was declared a public highway, but leave was given one Parsons to erect a
two foot mill dam.2 6 A later act amended this and made Bryant's fork a public
highway from where it crosses the state line up to the mouth of Spring Creek which
empties into Bryant's fork above the town of Rockbridge.27 The James fork of
White River in Missouri from its mouth to the mouth of Finley creek, and Flat
Creek from its mouth up to John William's mill were declared public highways by
the same statute.2 8 The Platte River was declared a public highway from Whitson's
mills to its mouth.2 9 The Marias des Cygnes, the Marniteaux and the Little Osage
Rivers were declared public highways up to Ball's mill.0 The Grand Chariton was
declared a public highway from its mouth where it empties into the Missouri River
to the northern boundary of the state, but this act was not to affect the "right of
any person or persons who now have, or may hereafter have, a gristmill or other
machinery constructed on said river."3 1 Beaver Creek in Taney County between
Samuel Nelson's mill and its confluence with the White River was declared to be
a navigable stream "for all practical purposes."32 Big Piney fork of the Gasconade
River from the mouth to Newberry's mill in Texas County was declared a public
highway 6 8
18. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 87; repealed by Mo. Laws 1848, p. 121.
19. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 88.
20. Mo. Laws 1838, p. 88; repealed by Mo. Laws 1868, p. 279.
21. Mo. Laws 1840, p. 114.
22. Mo. Laws 1840, p. 115; repealed by Mo. Laws, 1871, p. 249.
23. Mo. Laws 1840, p. 115.
24. Mo. Laws, 1840, p. 115.
25. Mo. Laws 1842, p. 69; repealed by Mo. Laws 1844, p. 300.
26. Mo. Laws 1842, p. 70.
27. Mo. Laws 1848, p. 121.
28. Mo. Laws, 1842, p. 70.
29. Mo. Laws 1844, p. 299.
30. Mo. Laws 1844, p. 299.
31. Mo. Laws 1844, p. 299.
32. Mo. Laws 1848, p. 120.
33. Mo. Laws 1848, p. 121.
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JumIcIm DETES LNATION OF NAVIGABILrIY
As has been mentioned before, determination of navigability has two different
applications, that which is sufficient for state retention of the title to the river bed,
and that which is sufficient to subject private riparian ownership to a public ease-
ment. Furthermore, the type of navigation, its value to the public, the size of
vessels the stream will admit, and the duration of practical use all enter the deter-
mination of navigability in either of the meanings given to the word. Because of
this, each decision must rest on the peculiar situation and facts surrounding the
individual river at the time, place, and under the use in question. It is very hard
to generalize, and close attention must be paid to the facts and opinions of the
reported cases.
In 1905, the case of McKinney v. Northcutt3 4 was decided. This was a suit for
injunction. The bill alleged that plaintiff was a tie contractor who floated rafts
of ties down Indian Creek in Washington and Franklin Counties to the Meramec
River, thence down the Meramec to market. The defendants owned land through
which Indian Creek flows and attempted to make plaintiff pay for his rafting. In
furtherance of this they felled trees in the river which stopped plaintiff's use.
Indian Creek, especially in March, April, May and June, was then fit, useful, and
capable of such floatage. When plaintiff tried to remove the obstacles, he was
threatened with arrest. A raft usually consisted of about six hundred ties. The
creek is from thirty-two to forty-eight feet wide, and from twelve inches to fifteen
feet deep. The Circuit Court of Washington County found for plaintiff and ordered
an injunction. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. In deter-
mining the test for navigability, the court said:
"... . capability of use by the public for purposes of the transportation of com-
merce, rather than the extent and manner of that use, affords the true
criterion of the navigability of waters. If they are capable in their natural
state of being used for the purpose of commerce, no matter in what mode the
commerce may be conduced, they are navigable in fact, and become in law
public highways" '35
This would appear to be a fairly broad test, allowing navigability regardless of
the manner in which it is carried on, and hints that the test will not be restricted
to "ordinary" methods. This liberality is somewhat restrained, though, by language in
Weller v. Missouri Lumber and Mining Co., which is discussed shortly. Furthermore,
saying capability of use rather than extent of use, would permit calling a stream
navigable although at that particular time it was not being so navigated, thus protect-
ing the public's future use. In connection with lapse of use, it has been said that
a river does not lose its navigability because of assertion of private ownership
which is submitted to in ignorance by the public.36 What is meant by 'commerce'
will be better illustrated by Slovensky v. O'Reilly, infra.
34. 114 Mo. App. 146, 89 S.W. 351 (1905).
35. 114 Mo. App. at 154, 89 S.W. at 354; See also, 56 ADu. Jun. Waters, § 181, p. 647.
36. 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters, § 52, p. 50.
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The McKinney case went on to say:
"Waters, to be navigable, must be so far navigable or floatable in their
natural state and in their ordinary capacity as to be of public use in the
transportation of property. Waters which can be made floatable only by
artificial means are not regarded as public highways. Nor is it necessary, to
constitute a stream navigable for floating and rafting within the law, that
they should be capable of continuous use during the whole year for that
purpose. It is sufficient to render a stream navigable, within the sense under
contemplation, if as a result of natural causes it be capable of floatage or
other navigation periodically during the year, and so continue long enough
at each period to render it susceptible to beneficial use by the public."3 7
Therefore, the case refuses to allow navigability to any but streams usable in
their natural state. Other jurisdictions have not been so strict and declare that
navigability does not depend solely on natural conditions of the stream, but if the
stream is suitable for navigation in all other respects, artificial aids will be allowed
to make the watercourse suitable for commercial navigation.38 From the standpoint
of beneficial use, the McKinney case allowed navigability when the stream was
capable of floating rafts of railroad ties for several months during the spring of
each year, but a case decided in 1926 refused navigability when a stream was only
able to float ties in extraordinary or "freshet" times, and then only for short
periods.39 On the basis of this, then, if the stream in its natural state, and with an
ordinary volume of water, either constant or regularly recurring with the seasons,
is capable of floatage useful to the public, it is sufficient.40
The Weller case, referred to above, was decided in 1913.41 It was an action for
damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff by reason of the obstruction of a navigable
stream in which plaintiff floated logs. Plaintiff alleged that defendant had wilfully
and maliciously planted a boom in the river to arrest the momentum of defendant's
logs in such a way as to prohibit the plaintiff's logs from getting past to his saw
mill, and forcing plaintiff to move his saw mill to a different location. The Circuit
Court of Carter County gave a verdict to plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
saying:
"a stream capable of transporting commerce in any manner in which such
commerce is ordinarily conducted is a navigable or floatable stream, and
is a public highway."42
This seems to require that whatever trade is to be carried on, must be done so in
the "ordinary" or usual mode of carrying on water traffic. It must be navigated
for the usual purposes, precluding any novel or extraordinary use. This follows
the general trend of thought and is in accord with the test applied by the United
37. 114 Mo. App. at 154, 89 S.W. at 354.
38. C.J.S., Navigable Waters, § 5 b, p. 50.
39. Greisinger v. Klinhart, 282 S.W. 473, 476 (Mo. App. 1926).
40. See: 3 TnrrANY, Rwm PsoPERTY, § 937 (3d Ed., Jones, 1939); 1 FAumaI,
WATRs § 23, p. 100 (1904).
41. 176 Mo. App. 243, 161 S.W. 853 (1913).
42. 176 Mo. App. at 256,161 S.W. at 857.
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States Supreme Court in The Daniel Ba. 4 3 That case involved an act of congress
which provided that it was unlawful for any vessel propelled by steam to transport
merchandise or passengers upon the navigable waters of the United States without
having obtained a license for the coasting trade.4 4 The Daniel Ball was navigating
on the Grand River in Michigan between Grand Rapids and Grand Haven, and
was not licensed under the act. The United States filed a libel in the District Court
for the Western District of Michigan in which it described the Grand River as
navigable water of the United States. The answer of the owners denied that it
was a navigable water of the United States and therefore the license requirement
was inapplicable. The district court dismissed the libel and the circuit court of
appeals reversed this decision and gave a decree for the penalty demanded for
violation of the act. In affirming the circuit court's decree, the United States
Supreme Court said:
"Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which
are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used,
or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travels are or may be conducted in the
customary models of trade and travel on water."4 5
In Hobart-Lee Tie Co. v. Grabner,4 0 the court gave an indication of what pur-
poses it thought would be sufficient to find state ownership of the stream bed of
the Gasconade River. In that case the plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from
landing ties on a sand bar which was on plaintiff's side of the thread of the
Gasconade River in Pulaski County. Plaintiff was in under a lease on land ad-
joining the river at the point in question. Plaintiff contended that the Gasconade
at this point was not a navigable stream, in the sense that title to the bed of the
river is retained in the state, but was in the adjoining owners to the thread of the
stream. Defendant contended that the Gasconade is a navigable stream and that
the island or bar which formed in the stream and finally attached itself to plaintiff's
bank did not become property of the adjacent landowner. Therefore, plaintiff had
no right to complain about defendant's use of the gravel bar in hauling ties along
it up to a nearby public road. The Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed the
plaintiff's decree granted by the Circuit Court of Pulaski County.
"We take judicial notice of the fact that the point on the Gasconade
river, where this cause of action arose, is near its source; that on the topogra-
phy of the country is stamped the grandeur of the magnificant Ozark uplift;
that the stream throughout the county of Pulaski is at many places narrow
and its waters swift and beautiful; that in the beds of the Ozarks stream
there are shoals and bars which furnish a happy camping ground for the
erstwhile fisherman; an occasional rapid joins in the chorus of nature, and
43. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 19 LEd. 999 (1871).
44. 5 STAT. 304.
45. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563, 19 LY.d. at 1001.
46. 206 Mo. App. 96, 219 S.W. 975 (1920).
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that while actually capable of floating logs, ties, and commerce of this
character, they are not navigable streams with the bed of the river in the
public." 4 7
This follows the United States Supreme Court in its decision in U. S. v. Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Co., which was a suit in the District Court of New Mexico to
restrain defendant from constructing a dam across the Rio Grande to accumulate
water for irrigation. The bill averred among other things that the dam will greatly
diminish the usability of this river at points downstream which float rafts of logs,
poles, and steamboats. The answer denied the river's susceptibility to navigation
at these points. The district court took judicial notice that the Rio Grande was not
navigable and dissolved the temporary injunction. Appeal was taken to the supreme
court of the territory which affirmed the dissolution of the injunction. Then the
United States appealed to the United States Supreme Court which reversed the
lower courts' decisions and remanded the case. In doing this, the Supreme Court
quoted with favor from Rowe v. Bridge Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344 (1839), saying:
"It is not, however, as Chief Justice Shaw said, 'every small creek in
which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water
which is deemed navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navi-
gable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of
trade or agriculture. "48
The case of Grobe v. Energy Coal & Supply Co. refused navigability to the Black
River in the sense of public ownership of the stream's bed. In that case, plaintiff
was owner of land on the bank of the Black River in Butler County and brought
this action to recover for gravel allegedly taken wrongfully by defendant from the
bed of the river. Defendant contended that the stream was navigable in the sense
that title to the bed was in the general public. Plaintiff got judgment in the Circuit
Court of Butler County, and defendant appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the plaintiff's judgment, saying:
"We may say, however, that there is no evidence of a substantial nature
tending to show that Black River along and adjacent to plaintiff's land is a
navigable stream in the broad sense and to the extent that the title to its bed
is in the general public.., but certainly Black river at the place in question
is not such a stream as will permit and bear the passage of ordinary boats
of commerce upon the bosom of its waters."4 9
In other jurisdictions there is a conflict as to whether the use to which the
river is put must be pecuniarily valuable. In Missouri it has never been specifically
decided; however, from the constant use of the word "commercial" in the Missouri
cases, it would appear that we follow the majority rule which requires that the
navigation be for some pecuniary purpose. Slovenslky v. O'Reilly5 0 was an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Missouri from the Circuit Court of Crawford County. The
47. 206 Mo. App. 96 at 104, 219 S.W. 975 at 977.
48. 174 U.S. 690, 698, 19 Sup. Ct. 770, 773, 43 L.Ed. 1140 (1899).
49. 217 Mo. App. 342, 351, 275 S.W. 67, 68 (1925).
50. 233 S.W. 478 (Mo. 1921).
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court affirmed the defendant's judgment holding that the Meramec River in Craw-
ford County was not a navigable stream in the sense that riparian owners lost their
interest in the bed when the stream changed its course and left its old bed. In the
court's opinion it called rivers navigable when they are used or susceptible of use
in their ordinary condition as highways for commerce over which trade and travel
may be conducted. The usual rule in other jurisdictions follows that theme by
declaring that the stream must be usable for commercial purposes, useful to trade
or agriculture, and capable of transporting the products of riparian cities and farms
to markets.51 The minority rule in other jurisdictions would call rivers navigable
if they allow pleasure floatage, even though pecuniary navigation is not possible or
practicable.52
In Greisinger v. Klinhart, supra note 39, a case involving injury to plaintiffs
lake frontage by defendant's opening the dam to the lake, which dam was on
defendant's property, the court summarized several guides for determining navi-
gability: 1) Is the stream fitted for valuable floatage? 2) Will the public or only a
few individuals be interested in transportation? 3) How great are the public interests
involved? 4) Are the periods of useful navigation sufficient to benefit the public?
5) Was the stream previously used by the public and for how long? 6) If declared
public, will it probably be of future public use for carriage?
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP SUBJECT TO PBLmc EASEmENT
A narrower sense of navigation has been imposed by the courts of Missouri on
some streams which are not navigable by ordinary river vessels, but which are
usable for the transportation of forest products, railroad ties, and other floatage.
This type of navigation is very beneficial to the public, but is not sufficient to allow
state or public ownership of the stream. Therefore, in cases of that kind the courts
have imposed an easement in favor of the public on the adjacent riparian owner's
interest in the stream and its bed. In the Delcour case, the Springfield Court of
Appeals held that a natural stream of water capable of floating rafts of logs,
timber, or ties to market is navigable in the sense that it is a "public highway"
which no one, not even a riparian owner, has a right to obstruct, and that the rights
of the riparian owner in the adjoining land, and the stream bed are subject to the
easement of the public "which rests on the necessities of commerce."5 3 The court
went on to say at p. 227 that in order to "constitute a stream a highway or navigable
in fact" it must have sufficient capacity to be useful for navigation, meaning "trade
and travel in the usual and ordinary modes." They further said that if the stream
is being used to float logs and ties it would be considered a navigable stream, in
the sense of creating a public easement. It would not be enough, however, if the
stream would only permit canoes and small fishing boats to navigate its waters for -
purposes of fishing.
51. 1 FA.zmA , WATERS § 23, p. 100 et seq.
52. 56 Am. JuR., Waters, § 181, p. 648.
53. 263 S.W. 2d at 224.
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The supreme court agreed with the Springfield Court of Appeals that the
Meramec at the point in question is not a navigable stream in the sense that title
is retained by the State of Missouri; but the supreme court did not follow the rea-
soning of the Springfield court on the issue as to whether the stream is a public
highway, and held that the capacity, suitability, and use of the river through the
appellant's land in the manner in which appellant intended to put it, made this
portion of the Meramec public waters and
"the submerged area of its channel over and across appellant's farm is a
public highway for travel and passage by floating and by wading, for business
or pleasure, and that in traveling the course of the stream by canoe or
wading, respondent was not a trespasser on the property of the appellant."54
The appellant had made a further allegation in defense of his position in that he
claimed an exclusive right to the fish in his portion of the stream. However, the
supreme court held that title and ownership of fish is in the state until reduced
to possession in a manner permitted by law, and since the respondent was not a
trespasser, he had the right to take fish from this stream in a lawful manner.5 5
The appellant made no attack on that part of the judgment which dealt with carry-
ing objects on land to avoid stream obstructions, but in dictum the supreme court
allowed the right subject to liability for damage to appellant's property.56 Nothing
was said with reference to camping on the shore, a privilege contended for in the
trial court.
The McKinney case required that streams, to be public highways, must be
floatable without artifical means, but did not require that they be usable through-
out the year. It would be sufficient if they were capable of floatage periodically
enough to be of beneficial use.57 The Grabner case distinguished this right of public
easement in this way:
"It is equally true that if the river at this point is a non-navigable stream
in the sense that the state or government has not the title to the river bed,
then the adjoining landowner's ownership runs to the thread of the stream,
and such ownership is subservient only to the rights of the public to use such
stream as a highway upon which it can float logs, ties and such other
merchandise as the volume of water will carry during certain seasons of
the year."58
It can be said, therefore, that the only difference between the courts' use of
the word navigability is one of degree. The tests put forth by the courts are similar,
the broader sense merely requiring a greater amount of traffic, in larger vessels
ordinarily used in river trade, in order to find enough navigation to put title to the
steam and its bed in the state. In order to be more definite, though, these rivers
which may be used by the public, but are owned by private individuals, should be
54. 269 S.W. 2d 17 at 20 (Mo. 1954).
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. 114 Mo. App. at 154, 89 S.W. at 354.
58. 206 Mo. App. 96 at 102, 219 S.W. 975 at 976.
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called "public highways" or, as done in some jurisdictions, "floatable rivers". Calling
these rivers simply "navigable" would lead to confusion with the broader sense of
state ownership, and thus should be avoided.59
CONCLUSION
The question of navigation has taken on new importance in recent times, and
with greatly increased interest in recreation, including hunting, fishing, and general
pleasure boating on the rivers of the State of Missouri a much greater number of
people will be affected by its determination. Elder v. Delcour brings up definite
problems that can be a source of difficulty, and strained relations between fisherman
and farmer. All too often in the past certain weekend nimrods have left the stream
so littered that even the most generous farm owner cannot welcome them. With
this new decision broader rights for the fisherman are recognized, increasing the
probability of landowner irritation. Perhaps one solution might be the expansion of
the State Conservation Commission's already vigorous program to include creation
of riverside parks, public lagoons and waterways by the use of the state's power
of eminent domain, so that all parties might be amicably reconciled.
ROBERT S. GARDNER
59. For a good general discussion of this type of stream, see: 3 TIFAxY, REAL
PROPERTY, § 937; 56 Am. Jua., Waters, § 188, p. 653; 65 C.J.S., Navigable Waters,
§ 1, p. 46; 41 W. VA. L. Q. 427 (1935).
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